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REDESIGNING GLOBAL TRADE INSTITUTIONS
John Linarelli1
We are at what might be the most propitious moment for change in
international trade institutions since Bretton Woods. After seven years, the
Doha Round stalled in July 2008.2 While multilateral negotiations faltered,
bilateral and regional trade agreements proliferated, in what have become
known as a “spaghetti bowl of crisscrossing arrangements.”3 To date, 474
regional trade agreements have been notified to the WTO, with 283 in
force.4 While regionalism seems to be becoming dominant as the approach
of choice for states to pursue their trade policies, a number of proposals to
reform and improve the WTO have been put on the table,5 with one of the
latest at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2011 suggesting a
radical change in the way the WTO system operates.6
All of this momentum for change comes at a time when the world has
changed a great deal even since the Uruguay Round.7 The Bretton WoodsGeneva-Havana triad of negotiations seems so far in the distant past.8
1
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for this essay at the 2020 conference.
2
See Carla A. Hills, The Stakes of Doha: Jump-Starting a Stalled Process __ FOREIGN
AFFAIRS __.
3
Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low, Introduction, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM:
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 1-10, 1 (Richard Baldwin & Partick Low
eds. Cambridge University Press 2009).
4
351 regional trade agreements were notified to the WTO under GATT 1947/1994 Article
XXIV, 31 under the Enabling Clause, and 92 under GATS Article V.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/region e htm (last visited March 10, 2011.
See Theresa Carpenter, A Historical Perspective on Regionalism,” in MULTILATERALIZING
REGIONALISM, supra note 3, at 13.
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Bernard Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment, World Bank
Policy Research Paper No. 5525, Jan. 2011.
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GLOBAL REDESIGN: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN A MORE
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (Richard Samans, Klaus Schwab, & Mark Malloch-Brown eds.
2010 World Economic Forum), http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-redesigninitiative/index html (last visited March 6, 2011
7
The Uruguay Round had its official start in September 1986 in Punta del Este Uruguay
and concluded with the signing of the Uruguay Round agreements, which, among other
things, established the WTO, on April 15, 1995 in Marrakesh Morocco.
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact5 e htm (last visited March 6,
2011).
8
It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss Bretton Woods, Geneva, and Havana
negotiations in detail. At the 1944 conference at Bretton Woods the International Monetary
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Global economic power is becoming more distributed, with fast developing
countries such as China and India, and the middle-income countries of Asia,
emerging as growing economic forces to contend with the slow growing
economies of the United States, the European Union, and Japan.9 Trade
policy is no longer a matter of simple trade liberalization along nationalist
lines, but a matter of production sharing and global supply chains. 10
Interdependence is a fact of global economic life. The facts of globalization
seem beyond the comprehension of the ordinary citizen. Talk of offshoring
and outsourcing jobs is becoming quaint, as it fails to capture the
complexities of global production sharing, the global labor markets it
requires, and the benefits and burdens it distributes.
Where do we go from here? We can understand and try to predict, if
ever so generally, legal change. The table below provides a way to
understand legal change, picturing for us the distinctions between changes
in rules versus structure of institutions, evaluation of change from an
internal versus an external perspective, and the distinction between the
prescriptive and the descriptive or predictive.
Structural

Internal (values given)

Prescriptive

Rules

External (critical)

Descriptive/Predictive

The distinction between understanding legal change on the basis of rules
versus structure lies in understanding the differences between these sorts of
claims: “The rule on last substantial transformation as determinative of the
origin of a good when more than one country is involved in the production

Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank)
were established. At Bretton Woods, countries agreed that a need existed for an
intergovernmental organization to deal with international trade. An agreement was reached
in Geneva in October 1947 on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. (GATT) and in
March 1948, an agreement was reached in Havana on the International Trade Organization
(ITO) Charter. The U.S. Congress foiled the ITO’s creation by repeatedly failing to
approve U.S. entry into the ITO. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 23-28 (2nd ed. Oxford University Press)(overview of the negotiations and process).
9
GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __.
10
Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low, Introduction, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM:
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 2 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low eds.
Cambridge University Press 2009). See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
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of a good, as found in Article 9 of the WTO Rules of Origin Agreement,11
will (or should) change to better reflect the nature of national contributions
to products,” versus “rules of origin no longer do the work they were
originally designed to do and broader concepts need to be developed to take
the value of innovation into account.”12 An evaluation of legal change from
an internal standpoint means that we take the values in the legal rules as
unalterable givens and evaluate rules on the basis of coherence, certainty,
predictability, completeness, and so on. An evaluation of legal change from
an external standpoint means that we evaluate the values the legal rules
reflect, possibly in addition to the things we evaluate when we evaluate
from an internal perspective. For example, we might find from an internal
evaluation that the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (TRIPS) requires an extensive system of patent protection but
an external evaluation might find that requiring some developing countries
to implement extensive patent protection is unfair or bad for their
economies or societies.13 External evaluations are critical, which means
they inquire whether the law might be justified from some criterion such as
morality, justice, welfare, or efficiency. An evaluation of legal change from
a descriptive or predictive standpoint is an attempt to determine the actual
direction of the law. An evaluation of legal change from a prescriptive
standpoint argues for a direction the law should or ought to take.
These evaluative tools often work together. For example, we may want
to evaluate legal change from structural, external, and prescriptive
standpoints. Or we may want to evaluate legal change from a rules, internal,
and descriptive standpoint. Points in between these two extremes are also
available to us. The analysis of variable geometry in part I below is
structural, has elements of both the internal and the external, and is mainly
prescriptive. The discussion of basic operating or “constitutional” principles
beyond progressive trade liberalization, found in part II, is structural,
external, and both descriptive and prescriptive.

11

The
WTO
Rules
of
Origin
Agreement
may
be
found
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/roi e/roi e.htm (last visited March 6, 2011.
12
For an example of the deficiencies in rules of origin analysis to understand international
trade flows, see Andrew Batson, Not Really “Made in China:” The iPhone’s Complex
Supply Chain Highlights Problems with Trade Statistics,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2010, at
B1-B2.
13
For an overview, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 437-40; 448-72 (3rd ed. Routledge 2005).
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VARIABLE GEOMETRY

In the coming decades, one of the most important issues countries (and their
populations) will likely confront is in what framework they will conduct
most of their negotiations for trade agreements. Will the dominant model be
multilateral or regional? For those of us who lived as trade lawyers through
the Uruguay Round, the WTO has had a formative influence on us. If one
were to survey international trade lawyers of a certain generation, you will
basically hear, “it’s the WTO; is there anything else?” This perception of
the state of affairs is rapidly changing, if it has not already changed, as the
spaghetti bowl of regional trade agreements grows in size and complexity.
The 2011 Obama Trade Agenda makes the case for continuing with the
Doha Round but it also spends many pages explaining US regional and
bilateral initiatives.14
The phrase “variable geometry” has developed to refer to situations in
which a multilateral set of agreements exists, under some form of
overarching organizational structure, but not all countries adhere to the
same agreements the organizational structure covers.15 It is often a term
used to refer to a way to move European Union enlargement forward.16 The
European Union website defines “variable geometry Europe” to “describe
the idea of a method of differentiated integration which acknowledges that
there are irreconcilable differences within the integration structure and
therefore allows for a permanent separation between a group of Member
States and a number of less developed integration units.”17
There has been some recent discussion of applying variable geometry
concepts to the WTO and its multilateral agreements, particularly because
of the lack of movement in the Doha Round. Robert Lawrence’s “club-ofclubs” approach for WTO reform18 was the subject of the January 2011
discussions of the World Economic forum in Davos.19 The proposals are
currently short on specifics, but appear to advocate the dismantling of the

14

See
2011
Trade
Policy
Agenda
and
2010
Annual
Report,
http://www.ustr.gov/2011 trade policy agenda (last visited March 8, 2011.
15
See Mini-Symposium: The Future Geometry of WTO Law,” published at 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 775 (2006).
16
The phrases “concentric circles” and “multi-speed Europe” are used to explain similar
concepts. See J.A. Usher, Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles: Patterns for the
European Union, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 243 (1997).
17
http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/glossary/variable geometry europe en htm (last
visited March 7, 2011).
18
Robert Z. Lawrence, Rulemaking Amidst Growing Diversity: A Club-of-Clubs Approach
to WTO Reform and New Issue Selection, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 823 (2006).
19
GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __, at 67.
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multilateral or single undertaking approach to WTO membership and
ministerial round negotiations.
The club-of-clubs approach may be postulated with or without a single
undertaking.20 There can be a set of plurilateral agreements with or without
most favored nation obligations, or, alternatively stated, with conditional or
unconditional most favored nation obligations. 21 What countries would
prefer depends on whether they care about free riding by countries who do
not agree to specific plurilateral obligations yet still reap the benefits.22
A move towards plurilateralism may be seen as a move backwards from
a WTO perspective, from Uruguay Round and on back to the Tokyo
Round.23 The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is held
out as an example of the right direction.24 This is ironic because the push
has been towards making the GPA multilateral. The WTO and powerful
WTO members have been trying to devise ways of broadening participation
in the GPA. One such effort was the attempted move during the Doha
Round to transform the plurilateral GPA into a multilateral framework
agreement with fewer obligations and focusing on transparency in
government procurement. 25 The work on transparency in government
procurement is officially on hold.26 Another such effort was a revision of
the GPA text, completed in December 2006, partly designed to provide
20

Hoekman, supra note __, at 13-15.
Id.; see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT AND WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 58-59 (Cambridge University Press
2000)(distinguishing conditional from unconditional most favored nation obligations).
22
Hoekman, supra note __, at 13.
23
The WTO website summarizes the negotiating history of the Tokyo Round as it is
traditionally understood:
[A] series of agreements on non-tariff barriers did emerge from the
negotiations, in some cases interpreting existing GATT rules, in others
breaking entirely new ground. In most cases, only a relatively small
number of (mainly industrialized) GATT members subscribed to these
agreements and arrangements. Because they were not accepted by the full
GATT membership, they were often informally called “codes”.
They were not multilateral, but they were a beginning. Several codes
were eventually amended in the Uruguay Round and turned into
multilateral commitments accepted by all WTO members. Only four
remained “plurilateral” — those on government procurement, bovine
meat, civil aircraft and dairy products. In 1997 WTO members agreed to
terminate the bovine meat and dairy agreements, leaving only two.
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact4 e htm (last visited March 8,
2011).
24
Lawrence, supra note __, at __; GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __ at __.
25
See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/min03 e/brief e/brief09 e htm (last
visited March 10, 2011).
26
Id.
21
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incentives to broaden participation, in particular by developing countries.27
Finally, there has been a significant move to make GPA accession a
condition for WTO accession, a move that makes the GPA close to being
multilateral. Mandated GPA accession as a condition to WTO accession is
especially critical for countries with large public procurement markets, such
as China.28 The point here is not to outline events that have shaped the GPA
but to inform the reader that many WTO members may be dissatisfied with
having plurilateral agreements in the WTO system. To suggest a move
away from multilateralism is a cut far away from the trend and conventional
thinking about the WTO. The perception of plurilateralism as defeat may
prove to be a significant obstacle to variable geometry in the WTO
agreements.
Variable geometry, moreover, may be seen as already with us. It is
currently accomplished through regionalism, outside the WTO but notified
to the WTO.29 To date, 474 regional trade agreements have been notified to
the WTO, with 283 in force.30 The variable geometry on the table right now
may be seen as a move to simply internalize regionalism within the WTO
structure.
The biggest obstacle to variable geometry at the WTO level is its
potential difficulties in dealing with complex global problems in need of
cooperation and compliance by significant numbers of countries. Variable
geometry may work for some trade issues that have to do primarily with
economics, such as tariffs, but there are hardly any of those left for
advancing cooperation among countries. It could make linkage of trade and
other issues, such as carbon taxes or labor standards more difficult to
accomplish. A number of commons problems will require multilateral
solutions.
II. FROM VARIABLE GEOMETRY TO CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER?
Clubs do not function without common values. 31 Three iterations or
generations of values seem to be at work, or should be at work, in the world
27

See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/gproc e/negotiations e htm (last visited March
10, 2011).
28
See Ping Wang, China’s Accession to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement –
Challenges and the Way Forward, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 663 (2009).
29
351 regional trade agreements were notified to the WTO under GATT 1947/1994 Article
XXIV, 31 under the Enabling Clause, and 92 under GATS Article V.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/region e htm (last visited March 10, 2011).
30
Id.
31
Values discussed at January 2011 World Economic Form, but the focus was almost
entirely on religious values. See “Moral Economy Dialogue: Global Agenda Council on
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trading system. The first is progressive trade liberalization, the second is
production sharing, and the third should be justice. “Should be” not “is” is
the right language for the third stage of values because justice ought to be a
goal for the world trade order in the coming decade and decades to come,
but it is by no means certain that it will be. In the schema of legal change
identified above, the discussion to follow is mainly prescriptive, external,
and structural, though we should not rule out the connection to the internal.
Values are important to legal analysis of WTO and regional trade
agreements. Attend any meeting of international trade lawyers, and the
implicit premise underlying their analysis, a concept of constitutional
magnitude, akin to liberty or equality in domestic constitutional law, has
been the idea of progressive trade liberalization, and now production
sharing.
Given the limits on the scope of this essay, what follows is only a brief
sketch of some of the issues relating to values in the world trading system.
The focus will be on justice, but nothing like a comprehensive justification
of the argument for justice as an operating or constitutional principle for
international economic institutions. I would refer the reader to just a
sampling of the recent literature on global justice, not all cosmopolitan in
approach, some in fact liberal nationalist in approach, but all of which argue
that justice is not simply a national or domestic concern.32
Faith” in GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __, at 229; John DeGioia, Creating a Values
Framework, in GLOBAL REDESIGN, supra note __, at 443. The exclusive focus on religious
morality ignores the vast literature on global justice in moral and political philosophy. See
infra note __ for a selective sampling of very recent literature.
32
See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH (Harvard University Press 2011); IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR
JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 2011); RICHARD W. MILLER, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: THE
ETHICS OF POVERTY AND POWER (Oxford University Press 2010); THOMAS POGGE,
POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE PRO-POOR RHETORIC (Polity 2010); GILLIAN
BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT (Oxford University Press 2009);
DARREL MOELLENDORF, GLOBAL INEQUALITY MATTERS (Palgrave Macmillan 2009);
DENIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER: THE EVOLVING
STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE (Cambridge University Press 2008); DAVID MILLER,
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 2007);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY & SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP (Harvard University Press 2006); GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES: ACHIEVING GLOBAL JUSTICE (Christian Barry & Thomas W. Pogge eds.
Blackwell 2005); CURRENT DEBATES IN GLOBAL JUSTICE (Gillian Brock & Darrel
Moellendorf eds. Springer 2005); SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL
POLITICAL THEORY (Oxford University Press 2005); ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE,
LEGITIMACY, AND SELF DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Oxford University Press 2004); THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND THE DISTANT
NEEDY (Deen K. Chatterjee ed. Cambridge University Press 2004); KOK-CHOR TAN,
JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM
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When the GATT started out in 1947, the aim of the GATT Contracting
Parties was trade liberalization, mainly for tariffs. This was accomplished
through successive rounds of trade negotiations33 The operating principle
for these trade negotiating rounds was progressive trade liberalization,
structured around the political influence of producers in national
governments and the power of governments in trade negotiations. As Paul
Krugman explains, “[i]f economists ruled the world, there would be no need
for a World Trade Organization. The economist’s case for free trade is
essentially a unilateral case – that is, it says that a country serves its own
interests by pursuing free trade regardless of what other countries may
do. . . . Fortunately or unfortunately, the world is not ruled by economists.
The compelling economic case for unilateral free trade carries hardly any
weight among people who really matter.”34 Krugman elaborates: “Anyone
who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations eventually
realizes that they can only be understood by realizing that they are a game
scored by mercantilist rules, in which an increase in exports – no matter
how expensive to produce in terms of opportunities foregone – is a victory,
and an increase in imports – no matter how may resources it releases for
other uses – is a defeat.”35 What happens in trade negotiations is governed
by politics. Governments want to close markets in which their country lacks
comparative advantage and open markets in which it does. The result is
global markets for goods and services that cannot be described as “free” but
in which the legal rules of the game are ever so important in determining
the market for particular goods and services.
The progressive liberalization operating principle could be said to have
transformed into a production-sharing norm after the Uruguay Round. As
Baldwin and Low explain:
This is a world in which production processes are spread
through multiple jurisdictions across the world. The political
economy effects of this fragmentation have been significant
– blunting the old distinctions between “us” and “them” that
use to drive trade policy. Producer interests that previously
(Cambridge University Press 2004). My apologies to any authors and their works I have
omitted. I have not included the recent human rights/international trade literature, which is
also vast. A crass commercial message for my own work: GLOBAL JUSTICE AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW; OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (Chi Carmody, Frank
Garcia, & John Linarelli eds., Cambridge University Press forthcoming 2011). I am also at
work as editor on RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW, to be published by Edward Elgar.
33
LOWENFELD, supra note __, at 48-71.
34
Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 113
(1997).
35
Id., at __.
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sought to protect their local markets from outsiders now
worry about market access conditions and trade costs in a
range of other markets as well. Hence the growing political
economy forces that favor more open markets.36
Two results (and no doubt more) are likely to derive from this shift to a
production sharing norm. First, in the drive to open markets to facilitate
production sharing, producers lobby national governments to open more
markets. If the WTO process fails to deliver, regional arrangements are
sought. Second, producer interests are now more disconnected with citizen
interests than ever before, if they were ever aligned very much to begin with,
even in the era of the progressive trade liberalization norm. We are in a time
of the state-less multinational enterprises. But the politicians, subject to the
usual public choice ills, still promote the interests of these enterprises as if
their interests aligned with the interests of the polity and its citizens.
The result is that the international economic order, as a legal system or
legal order, is seriously disordered. The basic operating principle for
deciding the values or interests trade agreements should promote is that of
the multinational enterprise. Those values are decided upon essentially by
national governments even though the interest of multinational enterprises
are decidedly not national in their scope and indeed are sometimes contrary
to national interests. Whether the interests of multinational enterprises align
with those of citizens, labor, and consumers is really quite accidental, and
often in conflict.
There has been a good deal written about whether the WTO or the world
trading system is a constitutional order.37 It clearly is not.38 Constitutions
serve a number of purposes that the WTO or any set of international
economic institutions, even if considered together, were not conceived to
deal with. I will try to sketch out very briefly some of the important features
of constitutions. Among other features, constitutions resolve moral
disagreements among citizens. For example, American constitutional law
on the conditions for permissibility of abortions attempts to resolve a moral
disagreement that has divided Americans.39 Constitutions set the terms for
equality among citizens in a polity. For example, American constitutional
36

Baldwin & Low, supra note __, at 2.
A recent and influential work in the area is RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman
eds. Cambridge University Press 2009).
38
Dunoff’s contribution is particularly elucidating about the lack of constitutional structure
in the WTO. Jeffrey Dunoff, The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious Case
of the World Trade Organization, in id., at 178.
39
See Georgia Warnke, Interpretive Differences and the Abortion Debate, in GEORGIA
WARNKE, LEGITIMATE DIFFERENCES: INTERPRETATION IN THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY
AND OTHER PUBLIC DEBATES 82 (University of California Press 1999).
37
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law on standards for judicial review of legislation discriminating on
grounds of race, gender and economic categories are among the areas of
constitutional law setting the terms of equality in American society.
Constitutions respect and enforce identity claims of various groups in a
society, usually through recognition of liberty claims, thereby protecting the
ethical independence of each person.40 Constitutions provide for peaceful
participation of citizens in governance. Finally, they liberalize international
markets within countries, and in particular in countries that have adopted a
federalist structure of government. The WTO does none of these things save
one: liberalize markets. Perhaps even more significantly, the WTO is built
on the wrong lexical priority for what might be seen as proper constitutional
value system: economic power and economic efficiency trump rights and
justice. In a constitutional order, justice has primacy, not efficiency or
power. For example, in a domestic constitutional order, basic human rights
trump (or should trump) internal market liberalization. No one could
plausibly claim that efficient trafficking of slaves trumps the right of all
persons to be free, an extreme example, but it makes the point. In the world
trading system it is the reverse, and human rights concerns are often seen as
illicit or inappropriate for international economic law. This is so even
though trade rules now go beyond the border, to the regulatory autonomy of
a state, the core of domestic constitutional order.41 This wrong priority of
values is a symptom of disorder.
My point here is not to set up the WTO as a straw person. The WTO
was created with limited purposes. It was not set up to be a constitutional
order. It cannot be asked to do what it was not designed to do.
Rather, the point is to suggest that what is needed in the coming decade
and thereafter is reform of global economic institutions generally, including
trade institutions, something in the nature of constitutional reform. All of
the global economic institutions “taken together,” according to philosopher
Charles Bietz, “can be considered as the constitutional structure of the
world economy; their activities have important distributive implications.”42
40

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) is an example. The term “ethical independence
is from RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 368-71 (Harvard University Press
2011). The term reflects the well-accepted distinction between morality, which has to do
with duties to others, and ethics, which has to do with living a good life. RONALD
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 211, 485 n. 1
(Harvard University Press 2000).
41
See Joel P. Trachtman, Developing Countries, The Doha Round, Preferences, and the
Right to Regulate, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 111, 117
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds. Oxford University Press 2009)(on the “right to
regulate” of a WTO member).
42
CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 148-49
(Princeton University Press 1979).
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They form a basic structure of global society.43 Consider the following three
features of the global economic order and ask what values they should be
built upon to have legitimacy to most people. First, global economic
institutions affect life prospects in dramatic ways.44 They affect benefits and
burdens people are expected to accept. They substantially affect poverty and
inequality. The rules are often designed to make the rich richer and the poor
poorer. 45 Second, multinational enterprises benefit from inequality.
Production sharing means that products can be reduced to components that
can be made anywhere in the world where labor is cheapest, safety
standards are lowest, and environmental standards the most lax. Intraindustry and intra-firm trade comprises a larger percentage of trade flows
than ever before.46 Third the world is interdependent, in substantial part
because of global economic institutions. National borders do not
realistically determine the limits of social cooperation.47 As Beitz explains,
“international interdependence involves a complex and substantial pattern
of social interaction which produces benefits and burdens that would not
exist if national economies were autarkic.”48 In any such scheme of social
cooperation, it is difficult to argue that justice should not be required for
these institutional arrangements to have legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
There are so many ways I could have approached this essay. I could have
focused solely on the internal, on changes in rules in the coming decades,
such as on the work on the WTO built-in agenda, or on a synthesis of the
rules of regional trade agreements. WTO accession is a significant topic,
which I have ignored. My aim was to focus on two basic questions. One of
those questions is existential: what is to be of the WTO and world trade
institutions generally? This is the discussion of variable geometry. The
other question I focused on goes to the core values of the world trading
system: what should trade agreements do? Should they take questions of

43

See, e.g., Tan, supra note __, at 21. Tan is not the only source for this point.
Tan, supra note __, at 27-29.
45
OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE
FIGHT
AGAINST
POVERTY
(Oxfam
2002),
http://www maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=03042002121618 htm (last visited March
11, 2011); see also http://www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/trade/rigged rules (last visited
March 11, 2011).
46
OECD data.
47
Beitz, supra note __, at 149.
48
Id.
44
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distributive justice into account? These two questions, I think, will, or
perhaps should, have some play in the decade to come, and beyond.

